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Reservation Wages and Starting Wages
* 
 
We analyse a unique data set that combines reservation wage and actually paid wage for a 
large sample of Dutch recent higher education graduates. On average, accepted wages are 
almost 8% higher than reservation wages, but there is no fixed proportionality. We find that 
the difference between reservation wage and accepted wage is virtually random, as search 
theory predicts. We also find that most information contained in the accepted wage is 
included in the reservation wage, as one would predict if individuals are well informed about 
the wage structure that characterizes their labour market. 
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* All ML-routines used in this paper are either performed by using standard routines from Stata or are 
carried out using R (free software, for information see http://www.r-project.org/). All computer 
programs are available on request. 2 
1. Introduction 
 
The reservation wage for accepting a job is a key concept but it is seldom measured directly. 
We will analyse data for recent graduates and ask how well individuals perceive the market 
wage structure as reflected in market wages. The reservation wage plays an important role in 
job search theory (cf. Lippman and McCall (1976) or Eckstein and van den Berg (2007) for a 
survey). In the first instance, this theory was proposed to describe the job finding process of 
the unemployed (e.g Kiefer and Neumann (1979), Jones (1988)). Later, it was extended to 
job-to-job mobility (e.g Burdett (1978)) and the transition from school to work (e.g. Wolpin 
(1987) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1995)). Irrespective of the situation to which the job search 
theory is applied, the basic structure remains the same. In the simplest stationary setup, a 
group of homogenous individuals is searching for a job. They employ all kinds of search 
activities in order to receive job offers, and it is assumed that in each period these arrive with 
constant probability δ. The job offer made by the potential employer is characterized by the 
wage (w) and comes randomly from a distribution F(w). If we denote the discount factor by ρ, 
the optimal strategy of an individual is to accept a job offer if it exceeds the reservation wage 
(w
r).
3 The reservation wage solves the following equation:  
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where b is the monetary value of being in the present state. The basic model can be easily 




 , where  ( )
r gw measures the 
expected value of the gap between market wage and reservation wage. The gap depends on 
the probability of obtaining a wage offer above the reservation wage and the conditional 
expectation of the difference between market wage and reservation wage. It is straightforward 
to deduce that both the probability and the conditional expectation are declining in the 
reservation wage and hence,  ( )
r gw is declining in the reservation wage. The equilibrium 
value of the reservation wage depends on the labour supplier’s opportunity cost b of accepting 
the wage offer, on discount rate , wage offer arrival rate  and on the parameters of the 
                                                 
3  For a proof see Lippman and McCall (1976). 3 
wage offer distribution, as illustrated in Figure 1. Anything that shifts up the right hand side of 
equation (1) will shift up the equilibrium wage rate and hence, the accepted (conditional) 
market wage, but less so than the shift in the right hand side. Thus an increase in opportunity 
cost b and in the mean of the wage offer distribution will increase the reservation wage. The 
latter prediction implies that a variable that affects the mean of the wage offer distribution will 
affect the reservation in the same direction. An increase in opportunity cost b will increase the 
reservation wage and hence the conditional expectation of the market wage rate. However, it’s 
hard to predict relative magnitudes on (conditional) wages, as this will depend on specific and 
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4  Lancaster and Chesher (1983) derive, for model (1) that the elasticity of the reservation wage for 
unemployment benefit and for the wage offer arrival rate are both smaller than 1, and estimate values 




Clearly, the assumptions of this model are quite restrictive and many generalizations 
can be proposed. An important one is to allow for changes in the parameters of the model over 
time (nonstationarity). As such this does not change the optimal search strategy but the 
reservation wage is no longer constant in time but dependent on the duration of search: 
declining opportunity cost or updates of parameters of the wage offer distribution can easily 
be traced in Figure 1. In the literature, the distribution of the wage offers has been made to 
depend on worker characteristics like work experience and unemployment duration (Wolpin 
(1987) and Burdett and Vishwanath (1988)). Also the relation between the level of search 
activity and the job arrival rate has been investigated extensively (e.g. Benhabib and Bull 
(1983, Pissarides (1984), Balu and Robins (1990) and Bloemen (2005)). 
  Most empirical contributions to the search theory only seek to estimate a few 
structural parameters, such as the discount rate, the job offer arrival rate and parameters of the 
job offer distribution. Much work concentrated on analysis of the duration of unemployment, 
in which the reservation wage only plays an implicit role and there is no need to actually 
observe it (e.g. Kiefer and Neumann (1979) or van den Berg and Ridder (1998)). Similar 
research on the transition from school to work can be found in Wolpin (1987), Eckstein and 
Wolpin (1995, 1999), Bowlus et al (2001) and van der Klaauw and van Vuuren (2009).  This 
does not mean that in this type of research no inferences can be made. Indeed, some 
researchers investigate reservation wages on the basis of its implicit definition in a search 
model (cf. Kiefer and Neumann (1979), Wolpin (1987), Eckstein and Wolpin (1995), Bowlus 
et al (2001), Gørgens (2002) and van der Klaauw and van Vuuren (2010)) and others use the 
stochastic frontier methodology (Hofler and Murphy (1994), Webb et al (2003) and Watson 
and Webb (2008)).  
  In the SEO/Elsevier data that will be used in this paper, we are in the special position 
that reservation wages are actually reported. One of the first empirical investigations using 
actually reported information on the reservation wage can be found in Kasper (1976). Since 
then a limited number of similar papers has been published. One of the most influential papers 
is Lancaster and Chesher (1983). They conclude, among other things, that “people can answer 
questions suggested by optimal search theory and that their answers are both numerically 
consistent with that theory" (Lancaster and Chesher, 1983, p. 1674). More recent empirical 
research on actual reservation wages is reported in Jones (1988), Bloemen and Stancanelli 
(2001) and Blackaby et al (2007). Going from the analysis of the unemployment to the 5 
analysis of young graduates does not require large changes in the models that are employed. 
The magnitude of the parameters like the arrival rate of job offers or the characteristics of the 
job offer distribution, can be markedly different but the general setup remains the same. 
  Availability of observations on individual reservation wages opens up several 
interesting opportunities. Observing a meaningful structure of reservation wages can increase 
support for the theory (or, in the converse case, raise doubts), it can be useful for policy 
purposes (like setting an optimal unemployment benefit level) and it can test implications of 
the theory. We will focus mostly on the quality of the information that individuals use. Search 
theory assumes that individuals set their reservation wage in response to their perception of 
the market in which they search for a job. Their reservation wage will reflect their perception 
of the wage offer distribution. Thus we expect that reservation wage and market wage will 
move in tandem: variables that affect the market wage should affect the reservation wage in 
the same direction and presumably by comparable magnitudes. Systematic deviations between 
the two effects suggest that individuals do not have adequate information on the wage 
structure they are facing. Search theory also implies that the difference between an 
individual’s accepted wage and the individual’s reservation wage is random: the reservation 
wage reflects perceived market conditions and the accepted wage is just a random draw from 
the wage offer distribution, conditional on surpassing the reservation wage.  
  The relation between the reservation wage and the market wage has been disregarded 
in the empirical literature. In our data set we have individually reported reservation wages for 
the present job and the starting wage in that job. As discussed above, in general we can state 
that the reservation wage depends on the job arrival rate, the discount rate, the utility of the 
present position and the distribution of the wage offers. If we assume that this distribution is 
characterized by μw and σw
2 and that the relation of logarithm of w
r and the underlying factors 
can be approximated by a linear equation we can write: 
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Under the same assumption it is straightforward to specify the starting wage, i.e. the job offer 
accepted by the individual and therefore exceeding the reservation wage, as: 
 
01 log( )
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where the variance of the error terms is likely to bear some relation with  σw
2. Not only does 
the same factor play an important role in both specifications, but also if we account for the 
fact that μ is not observed and therefore has to approximated, it is quite likely that the error 
terms will display a positive correlation. In spite of this correlation, eqs. (2) and (3) can be 
estimated with OLS as long as we are willing to assume that we actually observe both wages. 
Unfortunately, this is not obvious from the reservation and starting wages we observe. 
Reservation wage and starting wage are asked in the same questionnaire, at the same time 
(asking reservation wage upon entering the market would obviously have been preferable). In 
more than 30% of the observations the reservation and starting wage are equal.
5 This seems 
an excessive figure and one can raise the question whether a considerable number of the 
respondents had difficulty
6 to indicate what their reservation wage is. They appear to have 
found a simple solution by plugging in the answer to the previous question: the starting wage. 
As a result we have to adapt our empirical model to accommodate this problem. 
  If we take it one step further, the reporting of equal reservation and starting wage 
might only be the top of the iceberg. In might well be that the respondents put down an 
estimate like the following of their reservation wage:
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 or log( ) log( ) log( )    where 0 1
rs r s ww w w             (4) 
 
Individuals do not have a clue about what a reservation wage is
8, but understand that it should 
be lower than the offered wage and decide to report some proportion. Some use 1, others use 
ω. It is simple to test (4) against (2). If (4) holds, b, δ and ρ do not play a role in the 
determination of the reservation wage, the coefficient of μ is one and the correlation between 
the error terms in (2) and (3) will be very high: 1 in fact. Unfortunately, this is only theory. In 
practice we do not observe the actual determinants of the reservation wage as postulated in 
(2). Still, estimation results based on proxies of these factors will give us information on the 
                                                 
5  Note that as such this is not contradicting job search theory: the reservation wage never exceeds the actual 
offered wage. 
6  An alternative explanation is unwillingness. We expect that putting down the reservation wage is less 
sensitive than stating actual or starting wage. 
7  Note that this specification shows a remarkable resemblance with the stochastic frontier approach to identify 
the reservation wage (Hofler and Murphy, 1994, p. 964). 
8  Of course, the phrasing of the reservation wage question has been done very carefully. Nonetheless, if people 
do not think in terms of the theoretical concepts of search theory, they are bound to give careless, sloppy or 
easy answers. 7 
reliability of the reported reservation wages.   
 
2. Empirical model 
In the first instance the analysis of reservation and starting wages seems to be straightforward. 
Denote the reservation and starting wage by wi
r
and wi
s. We will employ the usual logarithmic 
specification to relate these wages to the explanatory variables. Since we observe both wages 
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and estimate with OLS. If we allow for a possible correlation between the error terms, we can 
apply SURE or MLE under the assumption of a bivariate normal distribution. This will render 
more efficient estimates. As we discussed before, there is a problem however. There appear to 
be an excess number of observations with equality between reservation and starting wage. For 
29.3% of the observations this holds, whereas from theory only a marginal proportion is 
expected. Ignoring this feature might result in biased estimates and therefore we decided to 
take account of the peculiarity of the data. Let's distinguish two categories of observations: 
 
I. The observations with starting wage equal to the reservation wage: 
rs
ii ww    
II The observations with starting wage unequal to the reservation wage: 
rs
ii ww   
 
In the first case we are not sure that we can trust the observed reservation wage and we will 
simply ignore it; we will only impose that .
rs
ii ww  Clearly, we can also not be sure that the 
process that governs careless reporting of equality between reservation and starting wage is 
independent of the formation of these wages. Let's model the possibility that individuals will 
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Since we already specified the logwages (cf. (1), we have a complete model apart from the 
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  Specification (4) can be rewritten as: 
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where   is the expectation of  . i   This corresponds to the previous model if we impose the 
restriction  s r     apart from the constant. Alternatively, we can add log( )
s
i w to the 
specification of the reservation wage and  , r   apart from the constant, should equal 0. 
 
3. Data 
We use data from the Elsevier/SEO survey, held among recent graduates from Dutch tertiary 
education. A new cohort of graduates has been interviewed every year since 1996, with focus 
on outcomes in the first 20 months in the labour market. Dutch tertiary education is basically 
divided into two levels: higher vocational education (in Dutch abbreviated as HBO) and 
university education (WO). HBO-education prepares students for specific (categories of) 
professions. It is taught at about 60 special institutes evenly spread over the Netherlands. On 
average, 50,000 students graduate each year from HBO. WO-education is considered to be of 
a somewhat higher intellectual level and has a more general academic character; it also 
requires a higher level of secondary education for direct admission. It is taught at 14 9 
universities. Approximately 23,000 students graduate every year. At HBO-level students can 
choose between 250 different courses of study, while at WO-level they may choose between 
260 different specializations.  The survey is restricted to the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 
because only for these years a reservation wage is available. We pool these four cohorts, with 
a time dummy to distinguish them. Earnings are defined as log net hourly wages at the time 
the respondent started working in his present job. Salaries are self-reported and may contain 
the associated noise. The net hourly starting wage is calculated from the answer to the 
following question in the survey: "What was the net monthly wage when you started in your 
present job? Also indicate how many hours you had to work according to the labour contract." 
The net hourly reservation wage is calculated from the answer to the following question: 
"Suppose that during the negotiations for your present job, the employer would have offered 
you a considerably lower wage. What net monthly wage would have been just acceptable to 
you (assuming that the number of working hours remains the same)?" Note that we do not 
actually use the real wages when entering the labour market, but the starting wage at the  
present employer, very early in the career of the respondents. As Table 2 below indicates, for 
56.5% of respondents this is their first job. 
  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the hourly reservation and net hourly starting wages 
 
 mean sd min max  N
log reservation wage (logw
r) 2.541 0.209 1.778 3.377  10575
log starting wage (logw
s) 2.595 0.212 1.839 3.389  10575
logw
s - logw













s  0.076 0.049 0.000 0.223 7472
 
 
  For our empirical purposes, we excluded all respondents who are self-employed and 
all those for whom information on starting and reservation wages and data on important 
control variables are unavailable. On top of that we deleted the observations for which the 
reported reservation wage exceeded the starting wage (5.4% of the sample). In some cases we 
repaired the problem of the unavailability of a control variable by putting the value at 0 and 10 
adding a dummy variable. The resulting number of observations is 10575.
9 Of these 
observations, 1469 come from the 2005-questionnaire, 3382 from the 2006-questionnaire, 
2992 come form the 2007-questionnaire and 2732 come from the 2008 questionnaire.  
  Table 1 contains information on the logarithm of the net hourly reservation and 
starting wages and Figures 2, 3 and 4 give the corresponding histograms. If we consider the 
complete sample, the average hourly starting wage is about €13.40 and the reservation wage 
is about 5.4% lower. This is a modest figure, indicating that recent graduates have a good idea 
what they are worth on the labour market. The number of observations with equal reservation 
and starting wages is quite large: 29.3% of the respondents fall in this category. Apparently 
some respondents have trouble with answering the reservation wage question. As a result we 
decided to adapt our empirical model to allow for these potentially incorrectly reported 
reservation wages (cf. section 2). If we concentrate on the sample for which the reservation 
wage is lower then the starting wage, 7472 observations, we find that the difference between 
the starting wage and the reservation wage is 7.6%. The correlation between both wages is 
extremely high: 0.967 (complete sample) and 0.969 (reduced sample). This might again be an 
indication that the respondents have a hard time to understand the question related to the 
reservation wage or it might be that individuals have a very good idea what their wage should 
be. 
  At first glance the normal distribution appears to be a convenient distribution to use 
for both the log net hourly starting and reservation wage. The Bera-Jarque normality test, 
however, reveals that normality has to be rejected in both cases: we find test statistics 228.85 
(starting wage) and 447.51 (reservation wage, reduced sample), which are both considerably 
larger than the chi-square (2) critical values at 1%. The histogram in Figure 4 shows that 
indeed the difference between the starting and reservation wage is small. Few observations 
are encountered with a difference of more than 20% (346 observations or 3.3%). But the 
graph also clearly indicates that the gap is not a constant fraction of the starting wage. While 
indeed some anchoring of the reservation wage on actual starting wage should be expected, 
there is no simple proportionality between reservation wage and starting wage.  
 
                                                 
9  The sample we start with contains 29152 observations. For more than 40% of these observations we do not 
observe both the reservation and starting wage. 5.8% of the observations have a reservation wage larger than 
the starting wage. After deletion of variables with incorrect or missing information on the wages we are left 
with 14134 observations. After we delete the observations with incorrect or missing information on important 
explanatory variables we have 10575 observations to work with. 11 
Figure 2: Histogram of the logarithm of the net hourly starting wages 
 
 
Figure 3: Histogram of logarithm of the net hourly reservation wages 
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Figure 4: Histogram of the difference between logs of the net hourly starting and     
       reservation wages 
 
  The explanatory variables can be arranged in five categories: characteristics of the 
individual, characteristics of the education graduated from, variables relating to labour market 
experience, variables relating to job search and characteristics of the job. A list of variable 
definitions is given in Appendix A. Only a few variables need discussion here. “Fast 
graduate” is a dummy  variable equal to 1 if the student graduates in less than the nominal 
duration (usually 4 years), “Slow graduate” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the actual 
duration of university or higher vocational education is longer than 6 years. Work experience 
is divided in experience before and after graduation (“pre” and “post”) and the respondent 
may state whether this experience was relevant or not for the present job.  
  Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2. We also indicated the proportion of the 
missings for each of the variables. For some explanatory variables, the number of 
applications, the number of interviews and especially the number of job perks, the proportion 
is large. Deleting these variables altogether did not strike us as a good idea and indeed the 
estimation results show that these variables have a significant impact. Note that there might be 
an endogeneity issue as well. The search related variables but also the number of job perks 
and the absolute deviation in actual and desired working hours might be related tot the error 
0 .05 .1 .15 .213 
terms in the model simply because these variables involve a choice. Since we believe that 
these explanatory variables are important
10, it is no option to simply delete them from the 
specification.  For linear regression we have the option to use IV. We experimented with this  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. 
 mean  sd  min  max  prop. 
unknown 
Male 0.470 0.499 0 1  0.0 
physically disabled  0.093 0.291 0 1  0.0 
Age 27.231 3.569 22 63  0.0 
non Dutch  0.051 0.220 0 1  0.0 
education mother ¤  2.867 1.048 1 5  1.1 
Partner 0.511 0.499 0 1  0.0 
partner wo educated  0.160 0.367 0 1  0.0 
partner hbo educated  0.148 0.355 0 1  0.0 
partner parttimer  0.078 0.269 0 1  0.0 
partner fulltimer  0.394 0.489 0 1  0.0 
partner parttimer x higher educated  0.030 0.170 0 1  0.0 
partner fulltimer x higher educated  0.267 0.442 0 1  0.0 
Child 0.051 0.219 0 1  0.0 
living with parents ¤  0.134 0.340 0 1  0.8 
north   0.073 0.260 0 1  0.0 
West 0.543 0.498 0 1  0.0 
South 0.204 0.402 0 1  0.0 
logdebt ¤   0.958 1.357 -6.908 4.382  0.8 
no debt ¤  0.497 0.500 0 1  0.8 
academic degree  0.544 0.498 0 1  0.0 
average exam grade  7.204 0.535 6 10  0.0 
duration of education short ¤   0.485 0.499 0 1  2.0 
duration of education long ¤  0.246 0.431 0 1  2.9 
studied abroad  0.239 0.427 0 1  0.0 
membership of a student association    0.521 0.500 0 1  0.0 
                                                 
10  And this is confirmed by the estimation results. 14 
Table 2 continued   
 mean  sd  min  max  prop. 
Unknown 
pre-experience 2.760 8.214 0 55  0.0 
not relevant pre-experience       0.288 0.453 0 1  0.0 
pre-experience due to internship  0.728 0.449 0 1  0.0 
pre-experience typical student job    0.473 0.499 0 1  0.0 
relevant pre-experience  0.330 0.470 0 1  0.0 
post-experience ¤  19.173 11.689 0 73  7.1 
managerial experience  0.394 0.489 0 1  0.0 
number of jobs = 2                           0.275 0.446 0 1  0.0 
number of jobs =   0.160 0.367 0 1  0.0 
search duration before graduation +?  1.835 4.000 0 30  0.0 
search duration after graduation ¤+?  2.748 4.178 0 30  7.2 
# applications ¤+?  8.356 12.481 0 100  11.5 
# modes of search ¤+?  2.571 2.123 0 13  8.7 
# interviews ¤  3.573 3.738 0 79  11.1 
# job perks ¤  0.472 1.104 0 8  73.8 
abs deviation hours ¤  3.834 5.075 0 35  3.1 
public sector   0.083 0.277 0 1  0.0 
educational sector  0.126 0.332 0 1  0.0 
private service sector  0.291 0.454 0 1  0.0 
health sector  0.170 0.376 0 1  0.0 
industrial sector  0.094 0.292 0 1  0.0 
full time job  0.953 0.211 0 1  0.0 
 
to some extend but we found very similar estimation results as the ones reported in this paper. 
Since the IV-option is not applicable in the ML-estimation and because estimating a very 
large simultaneous model is not feasible, we decided to ignore this problem. 
  If we compare our explanatory variables with other empirical research on reservation 
wages there are some deviations. Some research uses unemployment insurance benefits (e.g. 
Kiefer and Neumann (1979) and Hofler and Murphy (1994)) as a measure for alternative 
income. Kiefer and Neumann (1979) also use the duration of the social benefits. Both 
variables are not relevant in our case since we are dealing with young people that have just 
graduated from school. They have no relevant labour market history and therefore can only 
rely on a very basic social benefit of lifelong duration and equal to 70% of the minimum 15 
wage. Non-labour income or wealth, sometimes partly measured by home ownership, is used 
by Kiefer and Neumann (1979), Hofler and Murphy (1994) and Bloemen and Stancanelli 
(2001). Unfortunately we do not have full information on this kind of variables. In our 
opinion this is not a big issue because we investigate the behaviour of very young people who 
did not yet have the chance to accumulate wealth. A variable that is available and that is 
related to wealth is study debt. We included logdebt in our reservation wage specification 
where we also added a dummy for those persons without a study debt. Some of them might 
already own a house, but we expect that their number will be relatively small and on top of 
that for almost all of them the house will be burdened by a mortgage. Family income is used 
as an explanatory variable of the reservation wage by Hofler and Murphy (1994) and 
Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001). Again we do not have information on this specific variable 
but we proxy it to some extent by including a dummy for respondents with a partner, 
dummies for the educational level of the partner, dummies for the partner working part-time 
or fulltime and interaction effects of these last two dummies with educational level of the 
partner. We also added dummies indicating whether the individual has a child or is still living 
with his parents. The unemployment rate is included by Kiefer and Neumann (1979) and 
Hofler and Murphy (2004). We included time dummies to catch fluctuations in the 
unemployment rate in time and regional dummies to allow for regional differences in the 
unemployment rate. Additional to most research on reservation wages we included several 
indicators of search activity (search duration before and after graduation, the number of 
applications, the number of modes of search and the number of invitations for interview) and 
some nonwage job characteristics (number of job perks and the absolute difference between 
desired and actual working hours). 
  Only limited empirical research has been done on starting wages. There is no reason to 
treat starting wages differently from wages in general except for initial uncertainty of the 
quality of the match (cf. Feng Liang et al (2009) and Berkhout et al (2010)). Unfortunately we 
do not have information on the quality of the allocation. 
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4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Taking reservation wages at face value 
  Due to the high correlation between reservation and starting wage we noted in our data 
(see below) and because many explanatory variables have an impact on both wages, the 
estimation of a structural model will be marred by the problem of identification. However, in 
Table 3 we start with separate OLS regressions and then there is no technical problem. We can 
therefore include all our variables in the regression for both reservation wage and starting 
wage. There is of course a problem of interpretation and biased estimation results, but we will 
use the OLS only for a first reconnaissance. We use the full sample here, so we ignore the 
problem that for about 30% of the observations the reservation wage is equal to the starting 
wage.  
We distinguish three groups of variables in the reservation wage: market perceptions (shifts in 
the wage offer distribution), opportunity cost and the search process. Many results can be 
interpreted as correct perceptions. Males set a 2% higher reservation wage than comparable 
females. For every additional year of age, respondents state a 1% higher reservation wage. 
Regional differences are anticipated in the right direction. The south and especially the west 
of the Netherlands are the more economically developed regions, and individuals set higher 
reservation wages there. Strong effects are found for the schooling variables. Those 
respondents that have earned an academic degree demand some 10% higher wage than those 
who earned a HBO-degree. Given the Dutch educational system this is no surprise (cf. section 
3). Good students have higher reservation wages. For every additional average point-grade
11 
the reservation wage rises with 2.1%. If the number of working hours is deviating from the 
desired number of working hours a financial compensation of 0.2% per weekly hour is 
required. Experience effects in starting wages are well reflected in reservation wages. 
Internships, managerial experience and relevant experience as a student pay off, other types of 
experience do not, except experience in a typical student job. The latter effect is the only 
effect not reflected in the reservation wage. Work experience after graduation has no effect, 
but this is understandable from the short duration of experience for our labour market 
                                                 
11  In the Netherlands a 10 point scale is used at high school, HBO and university. It ranges from 1 to 10, where 
a grade higher than 5.5 is considered to be sufficient. At HBO and university sufficient final grades for each 
separate course are required to graduate. At high school an insufficient grade van be compensated by a high 
sufficient grade to a limited extend. 17 
entrants. Having done part of a study in another country has no effect whatsoever. Being a 
member of a student association does, despite its ambiguous definition. Not only elite 
students, members of real student associations, are included in this definition but also 
members of study associations.
12 Sector effects are neatly mirrored in the reservation wage, 
except for manufacturing. Some results are, perhaps, surprising. Individuals with some 
disability do not set lower reservation wages, and neither do individuals with an immigrant 
background. In both cases, they correctly anticipate the structure of starting wages. For jobs 
with many job perks, reservation wages are not lower, but higher: the number of job perks has 
a strong and positive effect on the reservation wage. This means that even if the nonwage job 
characteristics are relatively good, a higher wage is demanded. Apparently good jobs are 
expected to come with both high wages and good other job characteristics. Progressing 
quickly to graduation is correctly anticipated to pay off by an extra 1%. Remarkably, being 
slow to graduate also pays off, but this is not significantly reflected in the reservation wage. 
The lower wage for full time jobs is also surprising.  
  The opportunity cost of accepting a job is related to the household situation. We indeed 
find that the reservation wage is higher if there is a partner but the effect is eradicated if the 
partner works full-time; apparently, staying at home when the partner works full-time is not 
attractive. If the respondent has a child a 3% higher wage is demanded and realised. This 
might capture a nonlinear age effect, but the inclusion of age squared only marginally changes 
the estimated effect. If the respondent is still living with his/her parents, the reservation wage 
is lower, as we expected. Having a study debt, as a partial measure of wealth, does not have 
any impact on the reservation wage. This can be explained by the Dutch legislation with 
respect to these debts: they do not have to be repaid directly and only if the debtor earns 
enough money.  
  The search process itself is set in anticipation of the market conditions, but experience 
while searching may lead to adjustment of market perceptions. Search duration, whether 
before or after graduation, is associated with higher reservation wage. At the individual level, 
with longitudinal observations, one should anticipate a declining reservation wage (unless 
searchers find out that market conditions are better than they anticipated). Thus, this result is 
more likely to reflect heterogeneity: for reasons we cannot control for, these individuals have  
                                                 
12  Student associations are social associations not directly linked to a particular field of study. Members have 
special characteristics, e.g. a large proportion comes from the higher social classes. A student association is 
directly related to a field of study. These associations organise events directly related to the study and often 
organise central buying of study books. 18 
Table 3: OLS-estimations of the reservation and starting wages. 
 
  log reservation wage  log starting wage 
Variables Estimate |t-ratio| Estimate  |t-ratio|
Constant 1.9138 (39.16) **  1.8617  (60.57) ** 
Male 0.0203 (4.96) **  0.0200  (4.80) ** 
physically disabled  -0.0028 (0.46)   -0.0042  (0.67)  
Age 0.0109 (10.13) **  0.0101  (9.53) ** 
non Dutch  0.0125 (1.45)   0.0146  (1.77)  
education mother ¤  0.0042 (2.39) *  0.0045  (2.50) * 
Partner 0.0234 (2.01) *  0.0224  (1.90)  
partner wo educated  -0.0168 (0.75)   -0.0100  (0.45)  
partner hbo educated  -0.0197 (0.87)   -0.0149  (0.66)  
partner parttimer  -0.0133 (0.94)  -0.0078  (0.54)  
partner fulltimer  -0.0263 (2.12) *  -0.0251  (1.99) * 
partner parttimer x higher educated 0.0383 (1.45)   0.0298  (1.13)  
partner fulltimer x higher educated 0.0373 (1.62)   0.0313  (1.36)  
Child 0.0332 (3.03) **  0.0287  (2.61) ** 
living with parents ¤  -0.0163 (2.81) **  -0.0159  (2.71) ** 
north   -0.0220 (2.65) **  -0.0176  (2.12) * 
West 0.0226 (4.72) **  0.0232  (4.76) ** 
South 0.0096 (1.73)   0.0088  (1.57)  
logdebt ¤  -0.0020 (1.08)   -0.0019  (0.99)  
no debt ¤  -0.0026 (0.54)   -0.0028  (0.56)  
academic degree  0.1000 (8.68) **  0.1083  (9.19) ** 
average exam grade  0.0212 (6.24) **  0.0240  (7.00) ** 
duration of education short ¤  0.0100 (2.28) *  0.0102  (2.31) * 
duration of education long ¤  0.0095 (1.76)   0.0114  (2.07) * 
studied abroad  0.0042 (1.02)   0.0063  (1.47)  
membership of a student association  0.0079 (1.78)   0.0094  (2.08) * 19 
Table 3 continued 
  log reservation wage  log starting wage 
Variables Estimate |t-ratio| Estimate  |t-ratio|
pre-experience in months  0.0003 (0.47)   0.0003  (0.41)  
not relevant pre-experience  0.0061 (1.58)   0.0050  (1.26)  
pre-experience due to internship  0.0161 (3.95) **  0.0183  (4.42) ** 
pre-experience typical student job  0.0068 (1.86)   0.0090  (2.42) * 
relevant pre-experience  0.0303 (7.77) **  0.0286  (7.23) ** 
post-experience ¤  0.0000 (0.04)   0.0000  (0.07)  
managerial experience   0.0148 (3.75) **  0.0142  (3.56) ** 
# jobs = 2  0.0672 (9.94) **  0.0656  (9.49) ** 
# jobs = 3  0.0827 (10.44) **  0.0834  (10.33) ** 
search duration before graduation 0.0018 (3.59) **  0.0020  (3.92) ** 
search duration after graduation ¤ 0.0024 (3.45) **  0.0027  (3.83) ** 
# applications ¤  -0.0010 (5.01) **  -0.0010  (5.05) ** 
# modes of search ¤  -0.0092 (8.84) **  -0.0082  (7.66) ** 
# interviews ¤  0.0049 (7.49) **  0.0047  (7.23) ** 
# job perks ¤  0.0149 (6.19) **  0.0143  (5.90) ** 
abs deviation hours ¤  0.0019 (4.76) **  0.0016  (3.98) ** 
public sector  0.0820 (11.40) **  0.0885  (12.06) ** 
educational sector  0.0446 (6.39) **  0.0439  (6.27) ** 
private service sector  0.0156 (3.34) **  0.0158  (3.28) ** 
health sector  0.0801 (11.11) **  0.0763  (10.46) ** 
manufacturing sector  0.0512 (8.58) **  0.0100  (3.38) ** 
full time job  -0.0434 (2.97) **  -0.0447  (3.10) ** 
  model parameters 
R
2  0.3127  0.3110   
s
2  0.0303  0.0313   
N = 10575 (both equations). */** = asymptotically significant at 5%/1%. ¤ = for this variable a dummy for 
unknown is added to the specification if the information is missing for the observation (in that case the 
variable was put equal to 0). We also added three dummy variables indicating the year the observation was 
collected (2006 reference), educational field dummies and employer-size-classes to to both the specification 
of the reservation wage and the starting wage. The t-ratios based on robust standard errors are reported. 
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set a higher reservation wage and they are prepared to search longer. The number of 
applications and the number of search modes may also reflect heterogeneity: those who 
anticipate difficulty finding the job they desire, or who are more risk averse, may search more 
intensely while at the same time setting a lower reservation wage. But the negative effects we 
find may also be due to adjustments when market conditions are not as good as anticipated, 
leading to increases in search intensity and lower reservation wage rate. In particular 
unsuccessful applications may trigger such adjustment. The number of earlier jobs has strong 
positive effect: job changers state a 7.0% (single job change) and 8.5% (two job changes) 
higher reservation wage. As such this is a surprising result. Changing jobs once or twice 
during a very small time period, on average 20 months, is usually not considered to be a good 
sign.  An explanation might be that these respondents apply a stepping-stone strategy. The fact 
that the estimated effect of multiple job changers is even larger than that of single job 
changers supports this interpretation. Successful searchers who were invited often to job 
interviews have a higher reservation wage. Again, this may reflect unobserved heterogeneity 
or upward adjustment of the reservation wage.  
  Appendix Table B presents the result of a seemingly unrelated regression. These 
results should be more efficient, but in fact the differences are negligible. What we gain is an 
estimate of the correlation between the log net hourly reservation wage and the log net hourly 
starting wage. At more than 95%, it is very high.  
We conclude from the results so far that effects on starting wages are mostly 
anticipated in the reservation wage and that the effect of opportunity cost on reservation 
wages indeed tends to translate into a similar effect on realised starting  wages. The effects of 
the search process are not quite what one would predict at the individual level. Indeed, the 
number of earlier jobs and the number of job interviews ratchet up reservation wage and 
starting wage. But search duration increases wages and number of applications and number of 
search modes reduces wages. These effects are more in line with unobserved heterogeneity 
among individuals than with longitudinal effects for a given individual.   
  The models explain 26% and 29% of the variation in the net hourly reservation and 
starting wage. The estimated variances of the error terms are very similar in magnitude, but 
the variance of the actual wage is smaller than we expect. As reported in Table 1, the 
difference in mean reservation wage and mean starting wage, across the entire sample, is 
5.4%. The difference in intercepts in Table 3, reflecting the difference in mean wages if 
controls had the same effect on reservation wage and starting wage, is 7.3%. Thus, differences  21 
Table 4: Tobit-estimation of the difference between starting and reservation wages. 
 
  log starting wage -  
log reservation wage 
Variables Estimate |t-ratio|  
Constant 0.0422 (2.53) * 
Male -0.0006 (0.34)  
physically disabled  -0.0029 (1.17)  
Age -0.0011 (3.63) ** 
non Dutch  0.0026 (0.79)  
education mother ¤  0.0004 (0.55)  
Partner 0.0008 (0.17)  
partner wo educated  0.0078 (0.96)  
partner hbo educated  0.0051 (0.62)  
partner parttimer  0.0071 (1.32)  
partner fulltimer  0.0014 (0.29)  
partner parttimer x higher educated  -0.0107 (1.10)  
partner fulltimer x higher educated  -0.0071 (0.84)  
Child -0.0058 (1.49)  
living with parents ¤  0.0009 (0.37)  
north   0.0058 (1.83)  
West 0.0010 (0.51)  
South -0.0017 (0.73)  
Logdebt ¤  0.0002 (0.24)  
No debt ¤  -0.0014 (0.68)  
academic degree  0.0099 (1.86)  
Average exam grade  0.0038 (2.72) ** 
Duration of education short ¤  0.0008 (0.44)  
Duration of education long ¤  0.0014 (0.64)  
studied abroad  0.0023 (1.33)  
membership of a student association  0.0026 (1.39)  
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Table 4 continued 
  log starting wage - log 
reservation wage 
Variables Estimate |t-ratio|
Pre-experience before graduation -0.0001 (0.51)  
not relevant pre-experience  -0.0019 (1.16)  
Pre-experience due to internship  0.0037 (2.19) * 
Pre-experience typical student job  0.0031 (1.95)  
relevant pre-experience  -0.0021 (1.31)  
post-experience ¤  0.0000 (0.20)  
managerial experience   -0.0006 (0.36)  
number of jobs = 2  -0.0010 (0.35)  
number of jobs = 3  0.0026 (0.81)  
search duration before graduation  0.0002 (1.22)  
search duration after graduation ¤  0.0005 (1.56)  
# applications ¤  -0.0001 (1.03)  
# modes of search ¤  0.0013 (2.93) ** 
# interviews ¤  -0.0001 (0.28)  
# job perks ¤  -0.0007 (0.74)  
abs deviation hours ¤  -0.0003 (1.94)  
public sector  0.0073 (2.44) * 
educational sector  -0.0023 (0.80)  
private service sector  0.0008 (0.37)  
health sector  -0.0066 (2.30) * 
manufacturing sector  0.0062 (2.17) * 
full time job  -0.0010 (0.21)  
s
2  0.0050 (57.07) ** 
N = 10575 (both equations). */** = asymptotically significant at5%/1%.  ¤ = for 
this variable a dummy for unknown is added to the specification if the information 
is missing for the observation (in that case the variable was put equal to 0). We also 
added three dummy variables indicating the year the observation was collected 
(2006 reference) to both the specification of the reservation wage and the starting 
wage. We also added educational field dummies and employer-size-classes to the 
starting wage specification. 
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in the effects of the controls increase the gap between reservation wage and starting wage.  
  Search theory implies that all information on cost and benefits of search is 
acknowledged in the reservation wage and that the accepted wage is a random hit from the 
distribution of wage offers. Thus, we expect the gap between reservation wage and accepted 
starting wage to be a random variable, unrelated to any of our explanatory variables. To test 
this prediction, we estimate a tobit estimation of the difference between both wages, thus 
allowing for the fact that in 30% of our sample the gap is equal to zero. The results are 
presented in Table 4.  The prediction is largely supported. The intercept indicates that on 
average the difference is about 4.2%. We find only a few systematic effects. The gap is 
negatively related to age and positively to exam grade, internship experience, number of 
search modes, and to jobs in the public sector, the health sector and manufacturing. The 
effects are all very small though: 0.1% for an additional year of age, 0.4% for an additional 
year of internship experience, about 0.5 % for the industrial sectors, less than 0.4% for an 
additional grade point average (where grade point average realistically varies between 6 and 
9) and 0.1 percent for an additional search mode. Part of this small difference is explained by 
the 29.3% of observations for which we observe equal reservation and starting wages. Our 
next step is to take account of the specific nature of these observations in the way we 
explained in section 2. 
 
4.2 Allowing for selectivity and for doubtful reservation wages  
  As noted in section 2, we have some doubts on the reliability of the reservation wage 
for the large share of the respondents who reported exact equality between reservation wage 
and accepted starting wage. Nothing in the theory rules out such equality, but if this happens 
in 30% of the sample, one may doubt if these respondents really reported their true 
reservation wage. Model (6) – (8) therefore sets apart those observations where reservation 
wage and starting wage are exactly identical, and in those cases drops the reported reservation 
wage. 
Table 5 presents the ML-estimation results. For the probit part, the indicator has value 
0 for observations with equal reservation and starting wages. Thus, a positive sign indicates 
stronger inclination to report a reservation wage not equal to starting wage, and suggests a 
more honest answer. The estimation results indicate that indeed the choice to report equal 
reservation and starting wages is no coincidence. Men and the academically educated are less 
likely to do so, as are younger respondents. We also tried other variables characterizing the 24 
individual but we did not find any other significant effects.
13 The estimated correlations also 
indicate that the decision to report equal wages is not random. Both the error term of the 
reservation wage and the starting wage equation positively correlate with the error term of the 
probit equation. This indicates that relatively high reservation and starting wage will lead to 
reporting a difference between them. Allowing for deliberately reporting equal reservation 
and starting wages does not change the correlation between the error terms of the wage 
equations in comparison to the earlier SUR result.  
  With respect to the parameter estimates, we find very similar results to the SUR-
estimation. The standard errors mostly increase somewhat leading to fewer conventionally 
significant effects. The only difference of any substance is a positive effect of deviating hours 
on starting wages that earlier was negative (with SUR, not with OLS). We now estimate the 
difference between average reservation wage and average starting wage if controls had 
identical effect upon both wages at 7.5% (from the difference in intercepts).   
  Since the parameter estimates of reservation and starting wages are quite similar and 
to test whether the reservation wage is a more or less fixed proportion to the starting wage, the 
test suggested at the end of section 2 was carried out. We added log(w
s) as an explanatory 
variable to the reservation wage specification. If the estimated coefficient of this additional 
variable equals 1 and if, apart from the constant, no other explanatory variables is relevant, 
then we can conclude that indeed the reservation wage is merely a proportion of the starting 
wage indicating that respondents have a hard time to identify the reservation wage. The 
parameter estimate of log(w
s) is 0.953 with a standard error of 0.012 and therefore this 
estimate differs significantly from 1. On top of that a large number of explanatory variables 
are significantly different from zero.
14 
  All in all we have to conclude that reservation wages and starting wages do not stand 
in fixed proportion, but that there is a close relation. Apparently, individuals know the labour 
market well. They know what characteristics pay off and consequently they know what level 
of wages to expect. They adapt their reservation wage to this level resulting in parameters 
estimates that are very similar. 
                                                 
13  We also added log(w
s) to the probit-part of the model. The resulting parameter estimate is not significantly 
different from 0. 
14  To be precise: male, age, north,  # applications, # modes of search, # interviews, # job perks, north, , abs 
deviation hours, number of jobs = 2 and number of jobs =3 are all significant at at least 5%. 25 
Table 5: ML estimation of the full model 
 
  probit 
rs
ii ww     
Variables Estimate |t-ratio|  
constant 0.5460 (5.42) **     
male 0.0700 (2.63) **     
age -0.0218 (6.00) **     
academic education  0.2248 (8.38) **     
  log reservation wage  log starting wage 
Variables Estimate |t-ratio| Estimate  |t-ratio|
constant 1.6487 (32.53) **  1.7244  (33.89) ** 
male 0.0283 (5.27) **  0.0283  (5.27) ** 
physically disabled  -0.0013 (0.18)   -0.0001  (0.02)  
age 0.0103 (12.32) **  0.0097  (11.82) ** 
non Dutch  -0.0031 (1.05)   -0.0012  (0.33)  
education mother ¤  0.0028 (1.26)   0.0028  (1.24)  
partner 0.0213 (1.56)   0.0192  (1.39)  
partner wo educated  -0.0129 (0.53)   -0.0045  (0.18)  
partner hbo educated  -0.0088 (0.36)   -0.0013  (0.05)  
partner parttimer  -0.0179 (1.10)  -0.0134  (0.82)  
partner fulltimer  -0.0306 (2.11) *  -0.0295  (2.02) * 
partner parttimer x higher educated 0.0390 (1.35)   0.0306  (1.05)  
partner fulltimer x higher educated 0.0382 (1.50)   0.0317  (1.24)  
child 0.0394 (3.58) **  0.0355  (3.23) ** 
living with parents ¤  -0.0173 (2.28) *  -0.0178  (2.33) * 
north   -0.0238 (2.51) *  -0.0195  (2.04) * 
west 0.0210 (3.46) **  0.0208  (3.42) ** 
south 0.0182 (2.59) **  0.0197  (2.79) ** 
logdebt ¤  -0.0007 (0.32)   -0.0006  (0.26)  
no debt ¤  0.0096 (1.53)   0.0127  (1.99) * 
academic degree  0.1208 (7.26) **  0.1285  (7.66) ** 
average exam grade  0.0172 (4.06) **  0.0190  (4.45) ** 
duration of education short ¤  0.0036 (0.63)   0.0026  (0.46)  
duration of education long ¤  0.0142 (2.06) *  0.0190  (2.74) ** 
studied abroad  0.0025 (0.47)   0.0050  (0.90)  
membership of a student association  -0.0007 (0.12)   -0.0015  (0.25)  26 
Table 5 continued 
  log reservation wage  log starting wage 
Variables Estimate |t-ratio| Estimate  |t-ratio|
pre-experience in months  0.0000 (0.00)   0.0000  (0.05)  
not relevant pre-experience  0.0108 (2.14) *  0.0109  (2.14) * 
pre-experience due to internship  0.0045 (0.87) 0.0040  (0.77)  
pre-experience typical student job  0.0051 (1.08)   0.0064  (1.32)  
relevant pre-experience  0.0307 (6.25) ** 0.0292  (5.89) ** 
post-experience ¤  0.0001 (0.08)   0.0001  (0.12)  
managerial experience   0.0156 (3.12) ** 0.0148  (2.95) ** 
number of jobs = 2  0.0591 (6.67) ** 0.0553  (6.19) ** 
number of jobs = 3  0.0644 (6.51) ** 0.0613  (6.14) ** 
search duration before graduation¤ 0.0014 (2.48) *  0.0015  (2.66) ** 
search duration after graduation ¤  0.0010 (1.14)   0.0011  (1.19)  
# applications ¤  -0.0008 (3.42) ** -0.0007  (3.01) ** 
# modes of search ¤  -0.0117 (8.52) ** -0.0112  (8.08) ** 
# interviews ¤  0.0039 (5.00) ** 0.0034  (4.36) ** 
# job perks ¤  0.0121 (4.02) ** 0.0111  (3.65) ** 
abs deviation hours ¤  0.0017 (3.67) ** 0.0013  (2.78) ** 
public sector  0.0933 (10.05) ** 0.1016  (10.83) ** 
educational sector  0.0660 (7.71) ** 0.0708  (8.22) ** 
private service sector  0.0119 (1.83)   0.0110  (1.67)  
health sector  0.1039 (12.22) ** 0.1063  (12.44) ** 
industrial sector  0.0503 (5.56) ** 0.0539  (5.89) ** 
full time job  -0.0390 (3.13) ** -0.0408  (3.26) ** 
 model  parameters 
                                                                                                        Estimate     |t-ratio|   
variance error reservation wage (σr
2)  0.0279    (65.70)  ** 
variance error starting wage (σs
2)  0.0267   (67.50)  ** 
correlation between εri and εsi  0.9546  (872.73)  ** 
correlation between εri and ζi  0.3472   (27.87)  ** 
correlation between εsi and ζi  0.2364   (21.06)  ** 
N=10575. */** = asymptotically significant at5%/1%. ¤ = for this variable a dummy for unknown is added to 
the specification if the information is missing for the observation (in that case the variable was put equal to 0). 
We also added three dummy variables indicating the year the observation was collected (2006 reference) to 
both the specification of the reservation wage and the starting wage. We also added educational field dummies 




In this paper we have investigated the relation between reservation and starting wages. Theory 
predicts that all market information is included in the reservation wage and that the gap 
between accepted starting wage for a job and the reservation wage for that type of job is a 
random variable, not systematically related to personal or job characteristics. Basically, both 
predictions are supported in our data. Variables that significantly affect the starting wage also 
significantly affect the reservation wage, at the same magnitude. Having a partner that works 
full time and living with parents reduce reservation and market wage, having a child raises 
both. Other variables that reflect differences in opportunity cost of accepting a job are 
insignificant. We find slightly more significant effects if we estimate the reservation wage 
equation with OLS. This difference is in line with the difference between conditional and 
unconditional starting wages. The latter should reflect the distribution of wage offers, which 
should not be sensitive to opportunity cost of individuals. The former just considers the effect 
on accepted wages, which will be pushed up by higher reservation wage if opportunity cost is 
higher. But the differences are modest, and do not reflect a clear systematic effect.   
  Perhaps the key weakness of our data is the timing of response on the reservation 
wage question. The question is asked of employees for the job they presently hold. Hence, 
anchoring answers to actual wage may seriously distort the accuracy of the measurement. We 
find indeed that 30% of the respondents equate reservation wage and actual wage. To counter 
this distortion, we acknowledge it in our econometric model. Also, we checked the 
relationship between reservation wage and actual wage and clearly reject fixed 
proportionality. Thus we believe that the variation in the difference between reservation wage 
and actual wage generates meaningful information and that our results have sufficient 
credibility to take them serious and to build on them in further research.  
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Appendix A. Definition of variables  
   Individual characteristics: 
  male: dummy variable equal to 1 for male respondents; 
  physically disabled; dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to be 
physically disabled; 
  age: the age of the respondent; 
  non Dutch: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent states to have a non-Dutch 
background; 
  education mother: educational level of the mother of the respondent; 
  partner: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is living together with another 
person (not a child); 
  partner wo educated: dummy variable equal to 1 if the partner of the respondent has 
completed a university education; 
  partner hbo educated: dummy variable equal to 1 if the partner of the respondent has 
completed higher vocational education; 
  partner parttimer: dummy variable equal to 1 if the partner of the respondent works, 
but less than 32 hours per week 
  partner fulltimer: dummy variable equal to 1 if the partner of the respondent works at 
least 32 hours per week 
  partner parttimer x higher educated: partner parttimer times (partner wo educated + 
partner hbo educated) 
  partner fulltimer x higher educated: partner fulltimer times (partner wo educated + 
partner hbo educated) 
  child: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has a child; 
  living with parents: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondents is still living with 
his/her parents; 
  north: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is living in the northern part of the 
Netherlands; 
  west: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is living in the western part of the 
Netherlands; 
  south: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is living in the southern part of the 
Netherlands; 31 
  logdebt: the logarithm of the study debt. Put to 0 if the respondent does not have a 
study debt; 
  no debt: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent does not have a debt due to 
his/her studies. 
 
Characteristics of the education completed: 
  academic degree: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has completed a 
university education (reference: respondent completed higher vocational education); 
  average exam grade: the average of the grades earned in university or higher 
vocational education as reported by the respondent. Grading uses a standard 0-10 
scale; passing requires a minimum of 5.5, though not necessarily for all courses, as 
compensation is sometimes allowed; 
  duration of education short: dummy variable equal to 1 if the actual duration of 
university or higher vocational education is shorter than the nominal duration (usually 
4 years);  
  duration of education long: dummy variable equal to 1 if the actual duration of 
university or higher vocational education is longer than 6 years (nominal duration 
usually 4 years); 
  studied abroad: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent took some of his/her 
education abroad; 
  membership of a student association: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was 
a member of a student association during his/her studies; 
 
Variables relating to labour market experience: 
  pre-experience: total of the work experience of the respondent in months before the 
first job after graduation was accepted; 
  not relevant pre-experience : the work experience of the respondent in months before 
the first job was accepted that is not relevant for this first job (relevance assessed by 
respondent);  
  pre-experience due to internship: the work experience of the respondent in months 
before the first job was accepted due to internships; 
  pre-experience typical student job: the work experience of the respondent in months 32 
before the first job was accepted gained in a typical student job; 
  relevant pre-experience: the relevant work experience of the respondent in months 
before the first job was accepted (relevance assessed by respondent); 
  post-experience: the labour market experience of the respondent in months until 
starting with the present job; 
  managerial experience: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent claims to have 
gained some managerial experience during his/her working life; 
  number of  jobs = 2: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has had 2 different 
jobs in the period between graduation and the moment the questionnaire was 
completed ; 
  number of  jobs = 3: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has had 3 different 
jobs in the period between graduation and the  moment the questionnaire was 
completed. 
 
Job search characteristics: 
  search duration before graduation: job search duration in months before the study was 
completed; 
  search duration after graduation: job search duration until acceptance of first job, in 
months after graduation; 
  # applications: the total number of job applications of the respondent before the first 
job was accepted; 
  # modes of search: the total number of different modes of search used to find a first 
job (e.g. reading newspapers and magazines with personnel advertisements, open 
applications, employment agencies etc.);  
  # interviews: the total number of times the respondent was invited for a job interview 
before he/she accepted the first job. 
 
Present job characteristics: 
  # job perks: the number of nonwage characteristics of the first job (e.g. child care 
provided by employer, a bonus in stocks or money, computer, car or mobile phone 
provided by the employer etc.); 
  abs deviation hours: the absolute difference between the desired number and actual 33 
number of working hours; 
  public sector: dummy variable equal to 1 if the first job was in the public sector; 
  educational sector: dummy variable equal to 1 if the first job was in the educational 
sector; 
  private service sector: dummy variable equal to 1 if the first job was in the private 
service sector; 
  health sector: dummy variable equal to 1 if the first job was in the health sector; 
  industrial sector: dummy variable equal to 1 if the first job was in the industrial sector; 
  full time job: dummy variable equal to 1 if the first job was a full time job. 34 
Appendix B: Table A1: SUR-estimation of the reservation and starting wages. 
 
  log reservation wage  log starting wage 
Variables Estimate |t-ratio| Estimate  |t-ratio|
Constant 1.9138 (49.05) **  1.9684  (49.64) ** 
Male 0.0203 (5.01) **  0.0200  (4.85) ** 
physically disabled  -0.0028 (0.48)   -0.0042  (0.70)  
Age 0.0109 (15.83) **  0.0101  (14.47) ** 
non Dutch  0.0125 (1.61)   0.0146  (1.84)  
education mother ¤  0.0042 (2.41) *  0.0045  (2.52) * 
Partner 0.0234 (2.19) *  0.0224  (2.07) * 
partner wo educated  -0.0168 (0.87)   -0.0100  (0.51)  
partner hbo educated  -0.0197 (1.01)   -0.0149  (0.75)  
partner parttimer  -0.0133 (1.04)  -0.0078  (0.60)  
partner fulltimer  -0.0263 (2.32) *  -0.0251  (2.18) * 
partner parttimer x higher educated 0.0383 (1.67)   0.0298  (1.28)  
partner fulltimer x higher educated 0.0373 (1.85)   0.0313  (1.53)  
Child 0.0332 (3.67) **  0.0287  (3.13) ** 
living with parents ¤  -0.0163 (2.76) **  -0.0159  (2.65) ** 
north   -0.0221 (2.95) **  -0.0176  (2.32) * 
West 0.0226 (4.79) **  0.0232  (4.83) ** 
South 0.0096 (1.73)   0.0088  (1.56)  
logdebt ¤  -0.0020 (1.10)   -0.0019  (1.02)  
no debt ¤  -0.0026 (0.54)   -0.0028  (0.57)  
academic degree  0.1000 (7.91) **  0.1083  (8.42) ** 
average exam grade  0.0212 (6.40) **  0.0240  (7.12) ** 
duration of education short ¤  0.0100 (2.27) *  0.0102  (2.29) * 
duration of education long ¤  0.0095 (1.78)   0.0114  (2.11) * 
studied abroad  0.0042 (1.01)   0.0063  (1.47)  
membership of a student association  0.0079 (1.77)   0.0094  (2.06) * 35 
Appendix Table B continued 
 
  Log reservation wage  log starting wage 
Variables Estimate |t-ratio|   Estimate  |t-ratio|
pre-experience 0.0003 (0.50)   0.0003  (0.43)  
not relevant pre-experience  0.0061 (1.56)   0.0049  (1.24)  
pre-experience due to internship  0.0161 (4.02) **  0.0183  (4.48) ** 
pre-experience typical student job  0.0068 (1.84)   0.0090  (2.38) * 
relevant pre-experience  0.0303 (7.89) **  0.0286  (7.33) ** 
post-experience ¤  0.0000 (0.05)   0.0000  (0.07)  
managerial experience  0.0148 (3.81) **  0.0142  (3.61) ** 
# jobs = 2  0.0672 (9.78) **  0.0656  (9.39) ** 
# jobs = 3  0.0827 (10.77) **  0.0834  (10.68) ** 
search duration before graduation 0.0018 (3.98) **  0.0020  (4.30) ** 
search duration after graduation ¤ 0.0024 (3.49) **  0.0027  (3.85) ** 
# applications ¤  -0.0010 (5.43) **  -0.0010  (5.51) ** 
# modes of search ¤  -0.0092 (8.82) **  -0.0082  (7.77) ** 
# interviews ¤  0.0049 (8.33) **  0.0047  (7.95) ** 
# job perks ¤  0.0149 (6.58) **  0.0143  (6.21) ** 
abs deviation hours ¤   0.0019 (5.12) **  -0.0016  (4.31) ** 
public sector  0.0820 (11.55) **  0.0885  (12.27) ** 
educational sector  0.0446 (6.57) **  0.0439  (6.38) ** 
private service sector  0.0156 (3.17) **  0.0158  (3.15) ** 
health sector  0.0801 (11.90) **  0.0763  (11.17) ** 
industrial sector  0.0512 (7.58) **  0.0558  (8.14) ** 
full time job  -0.0434 (4.21) **  -0.0447  (4.26) ** 
  model parameters 
R
2  0.3127  0.3110   
s
2  0.0300  0.0310   
correlation  between εri and εsi  0.9537† 
N = 10575. */** = asymptotically significant at 5%/1%. ¤ = for this variable a dummy for unknown is added to the 
specification if the information is missing for the observation (in that case the variable was put equal to 0). We also 
added three dummy variables indicating the year the observation was collected (2006 reference), educational field 
dummies and employer-size-classes to to both the specification of the reservation wage and the starting wage.The t-
ratios based on robust standard errors are reported. † = significant at 1% (Breusch-Pagan test-statistic on 
independence = 9618, chi-square(1) distributed). 
 
 
 